6 Ways Automation Can Transform Your SMB’s Employee Management with Cost Efficiency
Dmytro Spilka·5 min

| Company | Founded | Latest Round | Total Raised |
| Talkspace | 2010 | Series D | $106.7M |
| Headspace | 2010 | Series B | $75.2M |
| Ginger.io | 2011 | Series C | $63.2M |
| Calm | 2012 | Series B | $143.0M |
| Lantern | 2012 | Series A | $21.4M |
| Pear Therapeutics | 2013 | Series C | $134.0M |
| Spire | 2013 | Series A | $10.1M |
| Quartet Health | 2014 | Series D | $159.5M |
| Lyra Health | 2015 | Series B | $103.1M |
| Modern Health | 2017 | Series B | $42.4M |
But there is still one big item missing -- big exits. Without them, there is a high risk the momentum will slow down, with fewer VCs, entrepreneurs, and operators committing to the space. The table below compiled by Stephen Hayes is telling -- incidentally, the article he published last month is great for those wishing to explore the topic of mental health deeper.
As the table shows, the vast majority of exits are therapeutic solutions rather than digital products. And most haven’t fared that great, case in point Neuronetics founded in 2003, raised $176M total, went public in 2018 at $264M and is today worth $64M. In this case the journey to IPO was longer than most VCs target, the initial market cap was low compared to their funding, and the stock hasn’t recovered since.
Indeed, why aren’t there big exits? Even for valuations the trend is lumpy at best. Calm famously became the first unicorn in mental health a year ago, in Feb 2019, but no company has reached that milestone since. Part of the reason is time. If we ascribe 2010 as the year when mental health startups rally started blossoming then we should start seeing the first major exits a decade later (i.e now).
That said, consensus is the top reason is business model. The stigma among consumers has reduced at least in the US but it is still there (i.e. it’s hard to get people to use and even more so pay for a mental health product). Providers, payors and pharma have a high barrier for adoption since they need to see significant data on efficacy and savings. We are talking FDA approval and / or long-term studies on top of the long sales cycle, which can add 2-3 years for such a B2B2C model to get traction. Then there is the often used hack of going through self-insured employers or HR benefit specialists which allows entrepreneurs to move faster, but that pathway has got very noisy.
So what to do? There are obviously no easy answers but perhaps allying with the larger players is indeed the key. In other words, significant partnerships with Big Tech especially for distribution, and clinical validation from The Establishment. Side benefit: brings the startup closer to the potential acquirer.
I have been in Silicon Valley for 20 years -- at Samsung NEXT Ventures, running my own startup (as of May 2019 a series D that has raised $120M and valued at $450M), at Norwest Ventures, and doing product and analytics at Google. My academic training is BS in computer science and MS in biomedical informatics, both from Stanford, and MBA from Harvard. I speak natively 3 languages, live carbon-neutral, am a 70.3 Ironman finisher, and have built a hospital in rural India serving 100,000 people.